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Atwo-period lifetime overlapping generations growth model is
used to evaluate the possibility that social insurance caneffectively
offset economic risks associated with uncertainty about the rate of
population growth. Crude measures of the seriousness of this type of
risk in the current United States situation are presented. Sufficient
conditions on the structure of the economy for such intergenerational
risk pooling to be mutually beneficial to all members of societyare
derived. Although it is logically possible to satisfy them1 weargue
that they are unlikely to be realized empirically in aneconomy similar
to that of the United States. Because of this failure, some more com-
plex types of policy options are also discussed.2
1. Introduction
Because the return to savings depends on future values of the
capital-labor ratio, fluctuations in the rate of population growth induce
variations in future consumption financed in this way. At the same time,
wages are similarly uncertain but negatively related to interest rates.
This simple fact raises the possibility that mutually advantageous social
insurance schemes might be found1 in which an intergenerational trans-
fer is made contingent upon the realized rate of population growth.
Among the arguments for social insurance has always been that
the government might have risk-pooling opportunities superior to those
of the private market. The government's advantage might take the form
of intertemporal averaging of random returns, smoothing out fluctuations
that would otherwise require a perfect ability to borrow and lend. Others
posit that the government might be able to pool risks at a single moment in
time in ways unavailable to private investors. These claims have been
seriously challenged on factual grounds, but, whether or not they are
correct, they do not apply to the risks of demographic change.
By its very nature, the size of one's generation is a random
variable common to all its members. There are no independent risks
among which to diversify. Even intertemporally1 although fertility rates
display a wide range of variation, they are highly autocorrelated. Long
cycles in the age profile of the population result, sometimes on the
order of decades. These types of risks are not effectively dampened by
the ability to borrow and lend over the life-cycle.
Therefore the prospects for mitigating demographic risks rest with
the government because the necessary social insurance policies would3
bridge generations not contemporaneous when the contract would have to
be initiated. In this paper, the possibility of using social insurance for
such a purpose is investigated. The results are not entirely positive.
Even though risks to adjacent generations are negatively correlated, it
may not be possible to improve the welfare of both in this way. For
some economic situations, however, mutually beneficial schemes do
exist.
The discussion is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some
specifics of the problem of demographic risks relevant to the current
situation in the United States. Section 3 discusses the criteria which can
be used to evaluate alternative social insurance ichemes. Thecase for
using a Pareto improvement of per capita ex ante expected utilities is
presented. This is the objective adopted throughout the later sections.
Section 4 derives conditions under which a 'small"change away from a
laissez-faire stochastic growth equilibrium will be mutually beneficial
for thembers of two succeeding generations. The results are largely
negative. It is shown that with logarithmic preferences and Cobb-
Douglas production functions there will never exist such a mutually bene-
ficial policy, for any initial oapital stock or stochastip structure of
population growth rates. Either a higher degree of risk aversion, or a
lower elasticity of substitution must prevail if social insurance can be
useful in this regard. Both of these possibilities are then explored.
With logarithmic utility, our general conditions require an elasticity of
substitution under .4, throughout the range of capital-labor ratios that
could arise as a result of different realizations of the growth rate. This
seems too low to offer any realistic hope in this direction. Higher
levels of risk aversion, within the class of those displaying constant
relative risk aversion, have the unfortunate property of implying a4
negative response of savings to the rate of interest. In the light of
recent empirical findings that indicate a positive elasticity, such an
assumption seems ill advised.
These conclusions demonstrate that although contingent inter-
generational transfer schemes seem as if they could effectively mitigate
risks of demographic change, and although this is a logical possibility,
it requires conditions which are unlikely to be met empirically.
Two further avenues for research and, hopefully, amelioration of
these results, are then presented.5
2. The Seriousness of the Problem:
Some Rough Calculations
To get a feeling for the kind of risk involved, we will first look at
some simple estimates of potential variations in the demographic char-
acteristics of the population. Between 1948 and 1975 the fertility rate
(children per woman of child-bearing age) fluctuated between 3. 77 arid
1. 75. A fertility rate of 2. 1 represents a level consistent with zero
population growth. The higher end of this variation was caused by a
variety of factors, most noticeably World War II and a second-generation
effect of the early 20th century immigration waves• For thesereasons,
demographers believe that we will not approach such a level again. A
fairly conservative upper-bound estimate is 2. 7. As for the lower end,
the explanations are largely sociological, combined with anincreasing
use of contraception and abortion. Although these are imprecisely


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The table above gives some statistics relevant to our crude corn-
putations of variations in the return to saving. Assuming that the rate
of saving is unresponsive to demographic changes occurring in thepre-
retirement years1 we get a first approximation to the impact of different
fertility rates on the capital-labor ratio.
If the amount of capital is K, the three assumptions of the table
produce capital—labor ratios of K/176 751, K/212,852 and 1<1152,378
in the year 2025 for fertility rates of 2.11 2.7 and 1.71 respectively.
Using a Cobb-Douglas production function1 with capital's share set at
• 25, the ratio of the marginal products of capital between the high and
low estimates of fertility would be about 3:4.
This seemingly modest variation in the rental price of capital would
produce very large swings in the total return to saving, accumulated over
an average holding period of say .20 years. For example, assuming constant
proportional taxes on the return to capital in either instance, we might have
a variation in the real net rate of return to saving of between 3% under the
high growth rate and 4% under the low growth rate. At the end of the 20
years, the accumulated wealth can vary by about 9% above or below its
mean level, and the return to saving over a15—yearretirement hbrizon
can vary by about 16% above or below its mean.2
The induced fluctuations in the wage rate of future generations are
smaller, in relative terms, but represent a comparable real magnitude
since wages form a larger share of national income. Wages net of tax
vary by about 7% above and below the middle of their range.
These calculations are obviously inaccurate for several reasons.
To a great extent, fluctuations in the effective working populationare
predictable long in advance simply because births lead labor market
entry by about 20 years. On the other hand, the current age structure8
of the population, including children, is taken into account in the above
table. Our rough computations therefore have already incorporated this
"foreknowledg&' about the future size of the working population.
The rough calculation given above took savings to be independent of
population. Knowledge about future births when they occur will, however,
make the course of the working population somewhat predictable by a
wage earner while he still has time to adjust his savings decisions before
retirement. To the extent that these risks can be partially offset by the
flexibility of private savings, our estimate of the induced variability of
the return to. capital may overstate the real risk of utility loss that may
be suffered.
The twO-period model developed in this paper is subject to the
same qualifications. Because the working period of life is longer than
the retirement period, a two-period model of an individual's lifetime
does not do justice to the richness of the individual's dynamic decision
process as new information accrues during his lifetime. A simulation
experiment trying to capture some of these complexities is currently
under way.
Further features not captured here relate to tije heterogeneity of
the labor force and the endogeneity of labor upp1y. Needless to say,
the structure of wages as a function of age is not constant, nor can It
be properly viewed as an exogenous function of some base wage level,
especially when large swings in the age composition of the labor force
are the central focus of the analysis. There are surely a variety of
institutional factors at work here, some of which are themselves
endogenous. We simply do not have a suitable theory to analyze this,
and it is beyond the scope of this study to construct one.9
These qualifications aside, however, it may still be useful to pursue3
therough calculations above to estimate the present value of a potential
reduction of uncertainty in future wages and interest rates. Since the
results of any such calculation are going to be sensitive to our choice of
a discount rate and guesses about levels of real income in the future,
among other parameters, we will give an illustrative case,and then
summarize the results under other assumptions in Table 2
To give a lower bound type of estimate, we will proceed in two steps.
We will estimate the present value of the stream of willingnesses to pay
for a reduction in uncertainty about future returns to saving for gener-
ations retiring from 2025 to the indefinite future •andsimilarly for
workers from that date onward. Therefore we will be neglecting uncer-
tainty in the intervening 48 years, which could be substantial as seen in
Table 1 above.
By 2025, real retirement income from savings might be on the
order of $11,000 per iamily, or more. Our estimates above suggest a
variation of from $9, 500 to $12,500 due to demographic factors. It is
not hard to imagine that a typical family would be willing to reduce its
income by $100 per year to cut the variance of this return in half. Thus,
for a typical retired family, the value of the reduction in uncertainty
discounted to its date of retirement (at 3.5%, an average real net rate of
return figure) over a 15-year average retirement period would be $1152.
The number of retired families in a given one-year age interval is
a random variable in the long run, but is rather easy to predict for 2025.
With about 30 million retired Individuals, who will form about 18 million
households in 2025, there would be close to 1.5 million households of
age 65 in that year. Averaged over the indefinite horizon, we can safely10
use a figure of about 2 million newly retiring households each year.
Thus, this reduction in uncertainty is worth about $2.3 billion to each
year's retiring cohort on their 65th birthday. To compute the total
social value of this stream at present, we must decide on a social rate
of discount. Using the same rate that was used for the individual's own
computations (a relatively high rate of return, historically, but surely
much lower than the gross return to private capital), we find that this
stream of $2. 3 billion per year, each year from 2025 onward, is worth
today $12.6 billion. Expressed as an annual flow of benefits, at the
same discount rate this is $442 million per year.
On the wage side, future real wages might be fluctuating.in the
range of $18,000 -$21,000,and a reduction in this uncertainty might
easily be worth $100 per family, as in the case of retirees. These
working families have wage earning horizons of about 45 years each;
accumulating over their working lives, one has $2250 per family. The
number of working families becomes more highly variable earlier than
the number of retirees. Let us take a conservative average figure of
100 million working families aged 18-65, or roughly 24 million new
working families entering the 18-year old pool each year. The benefit
per cohort is thus around $5.6 billion, which means a total present value
of $30.8 billion, or an annual flow value of $1.08 billion, at the 3.5%
discount rate.
Combining the benefits of wage earners and retirees, we arrive
at a flow value of about $1.5 billion per year, for a modest reduction in
the risks of population fluctuations. -Table 2
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equivalent 2655 1433 586 2807 1521 62612
Apart from its coarseness, and the other qualifying comments
related to a two-period framework already discussed in this section1 a
few comments should be added. The method by which we computed the
potential welfare gain is not a steady-state type of calculation. It is a
gain which would accrue now1 in the current economic situation of the
United States, because of the benefits of a social policy whose impact
would not be strongly felt until well into the next century. But even
though we have discounted these gains to the present at a generous rate1
they still are very significant. A steady—state analysis would surely
show a much higher level of gain, because it would not have to be dis-
counted over so many years.
The potential gain from mitigating risk is somewhat more hidden
than efficiency gains often studied in public finance. Physically, nothing
apparently happens to increase overall productivity or the efficiency of
consumption as in the case of a misallocation of resources. Neverthe-
less, the costs are real and their intangible nature should not disguise
the magnitude of the benefits at stake.
Unfortunately, the conclusions of this paper are largely pessi-
mistic. Although large gains appear possible, we will see that it is
not likely that they can be reaped while simultaneously improving the
welfare of all generations. The nature of such a welfare improvement
is discussed in the next section.13
3. Intergenerational Ex Ante Risk Pooling 3
Asdiscussed above, population growth fluctuations are risky both
for older generations whose return to savings will be affected, and
younger generations whose wages will be affected. The pre-natality of
the latter is at once the source of the uncertainty and the barrier to a
private market solution. A social contract is thus required which speci-
fies a pattern of intergenerational transfer payments in advance of the
realization of the demographic random variables. -
Howshall we measure the value of such a contract? One way
would be to use a utilitarian criterion; the utility of each agent would
be added in each event, and an expectation of this sum over all events
would be taken. Assuming that all members of a cohort are identical,
we would still have to know the joint distribution of an individual's
utility and the size of his generation. Therefore the efficacy of any
given policy would not be invariant to additive shifts in the utility index.
That is, just as in models with an endogenous population size, some
special meaning would have to attach to a utility of Tizeroll or else the
utilitarian criterion could not consistently be employed. This is true
despite the exogeneity of population growth, and quite aside from any
problems of intergenerational discounting.
An alternative is to require more stringent conditions on the
sequence of utility changes. Clearly no policy exists that would improve
the utility of all individuals in all states, unless the capital accumulation
program is Inefficient. Some type of ex ante expected utility measure
seen)s appropriate.
The utility of each generation depends on the initial circumstances -3
intowhich it is born, and on the events during its lifetime. But viewed14
from the date at which the policy is to be implemented, these initial
circumstances are also random variables, depending upon events in
the intervening period. Thus the appropriate expected utility for a
given generation is as viewed from the date at which the new policy
is formulated.
If a social insurance policy is Pareto improving in this sense,
then all individuals in the original position would prefer to have it
implemented regardless of into which generation they were (eventually)
born.
Is an intergenerational transfer scheme that is mutually beneficial
in this ex ante sense always feasible? If so, vihat are its characteristics?
Before answering this question analytically in the next section, we pause
to discuss the problem in more general terms. On the surface, the
answer to the feasibility question should be positive. The risks to each
pair of generations are inversely related. Therefore, an agreement that
reduces the effective wage below the competitive level when fertility is
low, increasing the yield to capital, and which reverses the direction of
the compensation in the high fertility case, would apparently result in
the same mean payoff to each agent while reducing ita variability. Utility
being concave in consumption and indirect expected utility being concave
in first-period income, this arrangement is apparently sure to succeed.
Unfortunately, however, matters are not quite this simple. If we
want to subsidize/tax the old people according to a function b(n) per capita,
where n is the ratio of young to old, the required tax/subsidy on the young
must be -b(n) in order for the government's budget to balance.The
subsidy function, b(), must be decreasing in n in order to reduce
rather than increase risks. Therefore revenue to be raised through15
taxes on the young would be higher when there are few of them, and per
capita taxes would therefore be adversely intensified. High total taxes
would be borne by fewer.young workers, and high total subsidies would
be spread out over many. For lack of a better term, we will call this
the population-bias effect.
The population-bias effect builds in an inherent problem for such
social insurance schemes. There is still one additional problem to be
overcome. When the gross return to capital exceeds the rate of popu-
lation growth1 it is well known that social insurance on a pay-as-you-go
4 basis reduces savmgs and is therefore unambiguously harmful in the
long run. If this form of risk pooling were to reduce savings, similar
effects would arise.
The problem therefore is to determine when and if the potential
benefits from risk pooling can outweigh the population—bias effect and
the depressed savings effect, if the latter is operative. An analytical
model of this is given in the next section.16
-4.Mutual Social Insurance Between Two Adjacent Generations
A. Conditions for Pareto Improving Smallt Contracts
Our analysis follows the standard lines of the two-period lifetime
overlapping generations model as introduced by Samuelson (1958)
except that the ratio of the population sizes between adjacent generations
is a random variable. A generation born at date t, called "generationti"
is assumed to consist of identical indfriduals with homotheticpreferences
for their present and future consumption. Generation tprovides labor
inelastically at date t, and makes a decision regarding consumption at
that date. The excess of labor earnings overconsumption is saved. At
date t+1, the size of the new working generation is determined.The
ratio of this generation's size to that of generation t is denotedn. After
the realization ofn. the marginal product of capital is determined1 and
gene ration Vs consumption at date t+1 consists of the principal and
interest on their savings. All markets are assumed to becompetitive.
Let
(1)ut(c,c) -
bethe utility function for members of generation t (y stands foryoung,
and r stands for retired).
Production is specified by a neoclassical constant returns to scale
technology. The function f(k) gives output per unit of labor as it
depends on the capital labor ratio at time t.
We will consider a social insurance scheme1eb(n)1 which repre-
sents the transfer to each retired individual of generation t-1 when the
realized growth rate isn. As discussed in the previous section, this17
implies a tax of —eb(nt)on the members of generation t in order to
maintain a balanced budget for the government.
The social insurance scheme is implemented at date 0, after the
birth of generation zero, but before they have made their savings
decisions. We assume in this section that the insurance scheme is
terminated at date 1, after the realization of n1 and after the transfers
have been carried out as required.
We think of e as a small positive number, in order to represent
a small change from an initial laissez-faire position. By differentiating
with respect to c we can discover whether such small systems
move ex ante expected utilities in a Pareto improving direction.
The principle datum of the system from the point of view of mem-
bers of generation 0 is the capital-labor ratio that they inherit, k0.
Competitive behavior in the labor market determines their wage w0.
If the agents in generation zero choose a consumption level of
cyofor
that period, their future consumption is given by
(2) cro(ni) =(w0_c 0)(1+f'(°'°)) +cb(n1).
Each agent behaves competitively with respect Lo his savings-
consumption choice, however. That is, they each regard the argument
of f', k1(n1), as a fixed random variable, independent of their own
choice ofcyo.
-
Tosimplify the analysis we will assume that utility is additively
separable
(3) ut(cn.crt) u>,Ac) ÷ 'rrt18
Let
(4) K1w0- c,0
andletc0(K1) be the optimizer of the expectation of (3) subject to
(5) Co(fli) =(w-c0)(l+f'()) +eb(n1).
The equilibrium c0 at date 0 is determined by the condition,
(6) c0(w- c0) =c0.
The first-order condition for an optimum of the expectation of (3)
subject to (5)is
(7)0Eu,(c0) -u'((w-c (' ()t cb(n))(i +f(I+f1(—t))).
Letc0 be the solution to the problem for generation 0 when the
policy is followed at e =0—thatis, when no intergenerational transfers
are being made. Let c0(n1) be the corresponding consumption in the
retirement period as given by (2).
The expected utility of generation 0 increases with respect to e when
(8) E u'(c°0(n1)) b(n1) > 0. r r
The welfare of generation 1 is harder to evaluate. The change in
dc*
generation 0's consumption,dewhich determines the change in the
capital stock at date 1, induces only second-order changes in the welfare
of generation 0. But since the marginal contribution of capital at date 1
to the expected utility of generation 1 is positive, the introduction of the19
policy induces first-order welfare variations in their utility through this
route as well as through the changes in risk characteristics of the
attainable consumption plans.
In general it is possible that the beneficial effects of the reduction
in risk may outweigh a utility loss imposed by a reduction in the stock of
capital. Let us begin, however, by asking for stronger requirements,
namely both that savings increase and that generation 1 should be better
off even with a constant savings level due to an improved risk situation.
We will return to the more general possibility at the end of this section.
To ascertain the change in savings in an initially laissez-faire
situation, we totally differentiate (7) at c 0, obtaining
(dCQ) =
Eu'r(c°0(n1)(1+ft(0Y))b(n1)
E u"y(c0) + u"(c°0(n1)) (1 (00)) +
co—c0)
.
0 0 E 1
- ni
The denominator of (9) is negative under the hypothesis that the
equilibrium attained at date 0, given by (6) and (7), is locally stable. There-
fore,' savings will increase only if the numerator of (9) is positive,
under our assumptions.
db(n1) Ifwewere to assume that E b =0and A<0,a conclusion about








In general. (11) cannot be signed, even under the assumption of increas-
trig relative risk aversion. However, for the family of utility functions
with constant relative risk aversion we have that
(12) u"• C00 + u" > 0for all n1.
Therefore (10) is positive and, together with the hypotheses
db(n1) (13)Eb0,dn
1
we have that(9) is positive. Savings, unfortunately, go down in this case.
Therefore, if we are to succeed with a search for policies b(.) that
increase savings and are beneficial in terms of risk spreading for both
generations in an economy with constant relative risk aversion, we will
have to allow for Eb<0. This serves to complicate matters because (13)
forms a simple sufficient condition for the positivity of (8). More generally,
we will have to regard (8) as a constraint to be checked for the particular
candidate b(•), a test which may depend upon the precise distribution of n1.
The constant relative risk aversion family has an interesting
property in this regard: Whenever b(S) is such that savings are
changed with respect to c, utility is unchanged as well. Moreover, this
result is independent of the distribution of n1 and of the production21








for all n1, where a is the parameter of the utilityca, a C 1. There-
fore, (8) and the numerator of (9) are identical up to a (negative) multi-
plicative constant.
11 (8) and (9) are bath non-negative, then the only remaining
condition necessary to have a mutually beneficial policy is that the
expected marginal utility of the transfer increase. The initial marginal
utilities of income are those associated with the wage rates at the initial
values of k1(n1), in the absence of taxation. A member of generation 1
will face the problem
(15) max U(cy1.w1cy1(1+f'(-)))
wherew =f(OYO)-
(wO-cYO),(OyO) 1 n1 n1 111
Letting U(n1) be the indirect marginal utility of income, w1, in the




-b(n1) since the transfer to a typical member of generation I is
n1
Thus, (8) and (16) together with the negativity of (9) assure that
the policy is valuable to members of generations 0 and 1.22
There is one further point to be noted, however. The policy we
have considered determines transfers at date 1 between these two
generations only. After that time it is assumed to be terminated. But
this does not mean that the effects of the policy are non-existent beyond
this date. The savings of generation 1 will surely be affected by the
realization of n1 and its associated transfer. This will affect the wel-
fare of generation 2, and all subsequent generations.
The induced change in generation l's savings has a different char-
acter than that for generation 0. The savings of generation 0 are
determined ex ante, before any realization of uncertain events,
but the savings of generation 1 is a random variable, depending
on the realization of w1(n1). As long as the marginal propensity to save
out of wage income is not zero throughout the range ofn1 (an irrelevant
possibility) there will be some change in the stochastic process through
which the capital stock is determined over time.
Under the hypotheses with which we have been working, the
stochastic process determining the capital labor ratio at each date is a
Markov chain. This can be proven as follows.
In order to show that (kt) is Markovjan1 we demonstrate that
kt÷l is functionally related to kt and Independence of (nt) then
assures this result. The per capita savings of each member of
generation t, dependson his labor income, which is just a function
of kt.If there are Nt members of this generation, their total savings
Kt÷l is therefore Kt+l = Ntst. But kt+l =N
=
n• which is the desired
t+.lt
result.23
Since the policy we have been considering is terminated at time I,
the Markov chain (k)2 evolves according to the probability laws
derived above. The expected utility of members of generations 2 and
later, being merely a function of kt at the date of their birth, we can say
that their ex ante expected utility depends only on the distribution of the
random variable kt. The social insurance policy affects this by changing
the initial probability distribution of k2. And1 as argued above, the dis-
tribution of k2 would shift due to generation l's transfer payment,
-b(n1)as well as through changes in k1.
1
Under the assumption that savings is a normal good, the distri-
bution of k2 after the implementation of the social insurance scheme
will not bear a stochastic dominance relationship to that before it.
Neither, therefore, will there be an unambiguous relation for any of
the kt. t > 2. In order to evaluate the effect of the transfer program on
generations alive only after its implementation has been completed, we
need to know more about individuals' risk aversion toward initial
income, the production function and the underlying distribution of nt.
Before pursuing this question in more generality, we present an
example illustrating the impossibility of creating a welfare—impràvng
policy for members of both generations 0 and 1 in an important special
case.Because of this result, there is clearly no welfare—improving
policy for all generations, and we need not investigate the issue of the
longer run residual effects of the transfer scheme discussed above.24
B. Impossibility of Successful Intergenerational Risk Pooling
in the Logarithmic —Cobb-DouglasCase
As a benchmark, though a somewhat unfortunate one, we consider
the case in which
(17) ut(c.crt) =alog cyt + (1-a) log c.
(18) f(kt)=k0<<1.
We observed above that if Eu,(c0)b(n1) =0,then both savings nd the
utility of generation zero are constant with respect to e. Using (17) and





Toderive the condition for welfare improvement for members of





Thus, using (14) and (20) the fact that, by the optimality of his consump-
tion choice, U =u(°1),we have
(21) E
ni
as the condition for ex ante expected utility improvement for generation 1.
Assuming that b is continuous, it must be zero at some value of
n1, say n1; for if b were one-signed, then (19) would be obviously25
impossible. Moreover, b'(n1) < 0 is required to insure the second-order
condition for a welfare improvement for generation 0.
Multiply (19) by the constant
1 +(1-a) wi
-1-pnl
and subtract the result from (21) obtaining
(1_a)#w'('i 1_P_n1) (22) 0 1
b(n1) C0
n1'(l-a w0P+n1)
as the condition for welfare improvement. It is apparent, however, that
(22) is false since by definition b(n1) > 0 if and only ifn1 <ri1, so that
the integrand will be everywhere positive. There is, therefore, no
social insurance scheme capable of benefiting both generations in this
example.
C. Logarithmic Utility but More General Production
The methods of the previous section can be employed to derive
sufficient conditions on the production function to admit welfare-
improving policies. The zero-savings change/zero utility changefor
generation 0 condition, analogous to (17) is
1 (23) E b(n )=0, 1
Ti126





where K is the aggregate amount of capital saved by generation 0, and
is thdependent ofn1.
In order to show that (23) and (24) are compatible with a function b
satisfying b' C0,it is sufficient to show that the elasticity of
(25)1 + (K)





Given this condition, one could multiply (23) by a factor such that these
multipliers of b will be equal at n1, the point for which b(n1) =0.If
the elasticity of (25) is greater than that of (26), its slope atmust be
(algebraically) lower. Moreover, if this relation between elasticities
held everywhere then there could be no other value ofn1 at which (25),
multiplied by this factor, equals (26). Thus subtracting this multiple of
(25) from (26) we would find that the result is negative if and only if
b(n1) is positive, so that (24) is satisfied. Indeed, this would show that
(24) would hold forfunction b() satisfying (23) and b' C 0, inde-
pendent of the distribution of n1. -
Thus,the relevant condition on the production function Is27






nl 1 n1 n1
which can be written straightforwardly as
<f'(f+ k) (28) a(li-f') f
where a is the elasticity of substitution of the production function f.
As a sufficient condition for the possibility of a successful social
insurance scheme, (28) expresses the fact that if the elasticity of sub-
stitution is sufficiently low, both future interest rates and future wage
levels will be so variable with respect to population that each generation
would willingly insure the other to some extent, even at actuarily unfair
odds. It is important to keep in mind that (28) is required to hold for all
values of k within the range that is induced through variations inn1. In
the Cobb-Douglas case studied above, where a E1,the right-hand side
of (28) can be written as
(29) _______
+ kFW
which varies from 1 to j3 as Ic goes from 0 to co.Thisexplains why
mutually beneficial social insurance schemes do not exist in that case for any
distribution of n1.5 With a capital output ratio of 3 and a marginal
product of capital in the range of .09 to .12, the corresponding upper
bound on a is about 1/3. Since this is surely not relevant for the present
technology, within the range of possible future values of Ic, there is no28
realistic possibility of mutually advantageous social insurance of this
type if logarithmic preferences accurately describe individuals' atti-
tudes toward risk.
D. Other Forms for Utility
The essentially pessimistic conclusions of the previous sections
night be different if individuals were to display a higher degree of risk
aversion. If we are to maintain the strategy of keeping both the savings
and utility of generation 0 constant and then ascertain whether generation
1 can be made better off by virtue of an improved risk posture alone, we
must use the constant relative risk aversion form of utility as discussed
in section 4A. This utility, however1 has the following unfortunate
property: If we consider members of this class in which risk aversion
is stronger1 these also imply a negative response of savings to the rate
of interest.
Recent empirical work (Wright [1969); Boskin [19761)
indicates that just the opposite is true. But the constant relative risk.
aversion utility functions that would be consistent with this fact are
precisely those for which even more stringent conditions than (28) on
the elasticity of substitution would be required.29
5. Conclusion 3
Theresults of this paper being primarily discouraging, shouldnot
dissuade us from studying more general types of socialinsurance
policies. It is important to investigate policies that are not ofa pay-as-
you-go sort. When the government can absorb part of the risk ofpopu-
lation fluctuations by running a publicly helddeficit, or by investing
surplus tax receipts in capital, much better ex ante welfareimprovements
are possible. Stokey (1977) has studied a model like this for inter-
generational risk spreading involving productivity. The greatdifficulty
with this formalization is that the feasibility condition for thestochastic
debt policy required is not obvious.
Finally, it is important to note that the results of thispaper are
only "local." The effects of social insurance schemes thatdepart
drastically from the laissez-faire solution are certainly worthour
attention. Non-convexities inherent in the model make this taskdifficult.30
Footnotes
1Cross-section and time theories estimates of the aggregate elasti-
city of substitution differ widely. Typically, the former are much higher
than the latter. The interested reader is referred to Brown (1967) and
Lucas (1969).
2The difference between terminal values of wealth is further
accentuated by the difference in the value of annuities at the interest rate
prevailing at the date of retirement. This rate is positively correlated
with the value of wealth, since interest rates vary with the (slowly chang-
ing) population structure. The computation in the text uses a 15-year
annuity to cover retirement consumption, and assumes that the rate of
interest is the average that prevailed during the generations working
lifetime.
The maintained assumptions underlying this table are:
1. $100-per family annual value of uncertainty reduction, for
workers and retirees in the 20-year savings horizon case and
for workers in the 15-year savings horizon case. For retirees
under the. 15-year average holding period of savings, it was set
at $80 per family per year.
2. Theretirement horizon is 15 years.
3. Every cohort enters the labor force at age 20 and works
until age 65.31
4. Assumptions about numbers of families per cohort are as 3
givenin the text.
The amounts shown are all in millions of dollars or millions of
dollars per year, except per family values. All benefits accruing
between now and 2025 are not reported.
This point canbedisputed if private intergenerational transfers
are widespread. See Barro (1974) and Feldstein (1976).
the CES case the validity of (28) depends on the two parameters
of the CES production function. For parameters giving a marginal
product of capital anywhere under .10, (28) remains false for all c32
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